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Abstract
Business cycle fluctuations in developed economies (N) tend to have large and persistent effects
on developing countries (S). We study the transmission of business cycle fluctuations for
developed to developing economies with a two-country asymmetric DSGE model with two
features: (i) endogenous and slow diffusion of technologies from the developed to the developing
country, and (ii) adjustment costs to investment flows. Consistent with the model we observe
that the flow of technologies from N to S co-moves positively with output in both N and
S. After calibrating the model to Mexico and the U.S., it can explain the following stylized
facts: (i) shocks to N have a large effect on S; (ii) business cycles in N lead over medium term
fluctuations in S; (iii) the outputs in S and N co-move more than their consumption; and (iv)
interest rates in S are counter-cyclical .
Keywords: Business Cycles in Developing Countries, Co-movement between Developed and
Developing economies, Volatility, Extensive Margin of Trade, Product Life Cycle, FDI.
JEL Classification: E3, O3.
"Poor Mexico! So far from God and so close to the United States." Attributed to
Dictator Porfirio Diaz, 1910.
This paper explores the transmission of business cycle fluctuations for developed to develop-
ing economies. Business cycle fluctuations in developed economies tend to have strong effects
on developing countries. When studying more generally the co-movement patterns, we observe
evidence that the effects of business cycles in developed economies (N) on developing (S) ones
are not only large but also quite persistent. In particular, they affect output in developing
countries over the medium term and not only at business cycle frequencies.
A natural channel for the transmission of shocks from N to S is through N’s demand for
S ′ exports. Below we show, however, that this mechanism is unable to propagate shocks to
S with the persistence we observe in the data. We explore a different channel: the cyclicality
of the speed of diffusion of new technologies embodied in new capital goods from N to S.
Following Broda and Weinstein (2006), we measure technology diffusion by the number of
different (durable-manufacturing) SIC categories in which N exports to S. We uncover two
main facts. First, the number of technologies exported from N to S co-moves positively with
N ′s cycle, both at high frequency and at lower frequencies. Second, at low frequencies, the
range of technologies imported from N leads S productivity measures.
To explore the quantitative implications of these regularities for business cycles in developing
economies, we build a real business cycle model. Our model has two asymmetric countries with
endogenous productivity growth. In the North, R&D investments lead to the creation of new
technologies and to productivity growth (e.g., Comin and Gertler, 2006). In the South, instead,
productivity growth is linked to the transfer of new technologies from the North (i.e., technology
diffusion). It is well known (e.g. Comin and Hobijn, 2010) that developing countries adopt new
technologies with significant time lags relative to their invention date. In our model, exporters
from N need to incur a sunk cost before starting to sell the intermediate goods that embody
the technology in S. This sunk cost of exporting generates the adoption lag observed in the
data. To close the lifecycle of intermediate goods, we allow firms to transfer the production
of the intermediate goods to S after engaging in another sunk investment (i.e., foreign direct
investment). This allows us to capture realistically the nature of capital flows to developing
countries, of which, since 1990, 70% have been in the form of FDI (e.g., Loayza and Serven,
2006).1
1The FDI share is even larger when restricting attention to private capital flows and when focusing in Latin
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As it is clear from this description, our framework is related to the product-cycle literature
(e.g., Stokey, 1991). The main theoretical contribution of our model is that it provides a unified
account of the dynamics of productivity over high and low frequencies in N and S. As in the
neoclassical model, the drop in current aggregate demand or productivity leads to a current
collapse in investment and output in S. However, in addition, adoption lags vary endogenously
with the cycle in our model. Contractionary shocks to either N or S reduce the present
discounted value of transferring a new technology to S, inducing pro-cyclical fluctuations in the
speed of technology diffusion. Because technology is a state variable and changes slowly, the
fluctuations in S ′ stock of technologies occur only at low frequencies. However, a few years into
the recession, productivity in S will have declined very significantly. As a result, the marginal
product of capital will still be very low and investment will have not recovered. The effect of
these extra state variables, is what allows our model to generate a hump-shaped response of S ′
investment and output to a recessionary shock in N.
In section 4, we calibrate the model to match basic (steady state) moments of the U.S.
and Mexican economies. The simulations show that our model does a reasonably good job in
characterizing the key features of the short and medium term fluctuations in Mexico. In doing
so, it sheds light on several important open questions in international macroeconomics.
First, unlike many RBCmodels (e.g. Backus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1992) our model generates
a higher cross-country correlation of output than that of consumption. It does so because
what drives the short term cross-country co-movement in output is the pro-cyclical response
of Mexico’s investment to U.S. shocks. Mexico’s consumption, on the other hand, does not
respond much contemporaneously to U.S. shocks. Second, our model also generates a large
initial response of S GDP to N shocks, which helps explain why business cycle fluctuations
are larger in developing than in developed economies. Third, consistent with the data, short
term fluctuations in N produce cycles in S at frequencies lower than those of the conventional
business cycle. This occurs because shocks in N triggers a persistent slowdown in the flow of
new technologies to S.
Fourth, the model generates counter-cyclical interest rates in S endogenously in response to
domestic shocks. As shown by Neumeyer and Perri (2005), an important feature of business
cycles in developing countries is the counter-cyclicality of real interest rates. Based on this
evidence, numerous authors have used shocks to interest rates in developing countries as a
source of business cycles. In our model, the procyclical diffusion of technologies generates
America and Asia.
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counter-cyclical fluctuations in the relative price of capital. These result in counter-cyclical
capital gains from holding a unit of capital that dominate the pro-cyclical response of the
marginal product of capital (i.e. the dividend), thus inducing interest rates in S (as well as the
interest differential with respect to N) to be counter-cyclical.
The endogenous international diffusion of technologies emphasized in our framework is a
different phenomenon from production sharing (e.g. Bergin et al. 2009; Zlate, 2010). Pro-
duction sharing models generate large fluctuations in output in S in response to a shock in N
by assuming strong cyclicality of wages.2 Firms in N compare wages domestically and abroad
and expand and contract their offshoring arrangements by increasing the extent of traded in-
termediates. An implication of these models is that the flow of intermediate exports from N
to S should be pro-cyclical with respect to N ′s cycle but counter-cyclical with respect to S.
In contrast, in our framework both recessions in N and S reduce the present discounted value
of future profits from exporting a new intermediate good to S. As a result, the flow of new
technologies from N to S is pro-cyclical with respect to both countries, and in particular to
S. The data examined here shows strong evidence of the pro-cyclicality of the flow of new
technologies with respect to S.3 A related issue is that it is unlikely that production-sharing
models or models of entry and trade in varieties (e.g. Ghironi and Melitz, 2005) can account for
the low-frequency effects of N ′s business cycle on S ′s productivity and output we observe in the
data.4 The key conceptual difference with these models is that, in ours, investment decisions in
international technology transfer involve sunk costs, while in the literature they are fixed costs.
As a result, our mechanisms introduce new state variables that can generate the low-frequency
international propagation that characterizes the data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents some basic stylized
facts. Section 3 develops the model. Section 4 evaluates the model through some simulations
2Another important assumption of production sharing models, though more plausible, is that the share of
manufacturing is larger in S than in N.
3A different approach to modeling production sharing is followed by Burnstein, Kurz and Tesar (2008).
Rather than using variation in the extensive margin, their model assumes a complementarity between domestic
and foreign intermediate goods in U.S. production. By changing the importance of the sector where domestic
and foreign intermediate goods are complementary, they can generate a significant increase in the correlation
between U.S. and Mexican manufacturing output.
4As we show in section 5, a key difference with trade in variety models is that the costs of affecting the
extensive margin are fixed but not sunk. Modeling the transfer of technology as a sunk investment introduces
a new state variable that changes the propagation and amplification of the shocks very significantly.
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and provides intuition about the role of the different mechanisms. Section 5 discusses the results
and compares them to the literature, and section 6 concludes.
1 The cyclicality of international technology diffusion
In this section, we explore the role of technology diffusion in the propagation of business cy-
cles from developed (N) to developing (S) countries. We focus on the two largest developed
economies as N -countries: the U.S. and Japan.5 We then select the S-countries based on the
concentration of their (durable goods) imports from N .6 That is, for each developing country
without missing data and with a population of more than 2 million people, we construct an
index of concentration of imports from each of the two N -countries. The index is just equal to
the durable manufacturing imports from N over total imports of durable manufacturing. For
each country N, we select the 10 developing countries with the highest concentration.7
We collect data on three variables. First GDP per working age person as a measure of output
both in N and S. Next, following Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) and Greenwood, Hercowitz
and Krusell (1997), we measure the level of embodied productivity by ratio of the GDP deflator
over the investment deflator. Finally, following Broda and Weinstein (2006), we measure the
range of technologies that diffuse internationally from N to S by the number of 6-digit SIC
codes within durable manufacturing that have exports from N to S that are worth at least $1
million.
Our data are annual and cover the period 1960-2008. We use the full sample period to obtain
the filtered series. However, as we explain below, we focus our analysis on the period 1990-2008.
Because we want to allow for the possibility that shocks to N have a very persistent effect in
S, we analyze fluctuations at medium term frequencies in addition to conventional business
cycles. Following Comin and Gertler (2006), we define the medium term cycle as fluctuations
with periods smaller than 50 years. The medium term cycle can be decomposed into a high
5We do not include the EU because it has a lower syncronization of the business cycles betwen its members
than U.S. states or Japanese prefactures.
6The emphasis on durable manufacturing goods is driven by the model and because durable manufacturing
goods surely embody more productive technologies than the average non-durable good. Having said that, the
list of developing countries would be very similar if we ranked countries by concentration in imports or trade.
7The developing countries linked to the U.S. are Mexico, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Hon-
duras, Guatemala, Venezuela, Peru, El Salvador and Nicaragua. The countries linked to Japan are Panama,
Thailand, South Korea, Philippines, Vietnam, China, Pakistan, Indonesia, South Africa and Malaysia.
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frequency component and a medium term component. The high frequency component captures
fluctuations with periods smaller than 8 years while the medium term component captures
fluctuations with periods between 8 and 50 years. We use a Hodrick-Prescott filter to isolate
fluctuations at the high frequency.8 We isolate the medium term component and the medium
term cycle using a band pass filter.
Two points are worth keeping in mind. First, it is important to be careful about the mapping
between the frequency domain and the time domain. In principle, our measure of the cycle
includes frequencies up to 50 years. However, Comin and Gertler (2006) have shown that
its representation in the time domain leads to cycles on the order of a decade, reflecting the
distribution of the mass of the filtered data over the frequency domain. For example, in the
U.S. postwar period there are ten peaks and throughs in the medium term component of the
cycle.9 Second, despite their frequency, medium term cycles identified with macro series of
conventional length are statistically significant (Comin and Gertler, 2006). We investigate the
significance of the medium term component of per capita income in the countries in our sample
by constructing confidence intervals using a bootstrap procedure.10 We find that 52% of annual
observations of the filtered series are statistically significant at 95% level. By way of comparison,
we find that 80% of the HP-filtered annual observations are significant. Therefore, we consider
that inferences based on series filtered to isolate medium term fluctuations are statistically
informative.
After filtering the macro variables, we study their co-movement patterns during the period
1990-2008. We focus on this period for two reasons. First, the volume of trade and FDI inflows
to developing countries increased very significantly during this period, making the mechanisms
emphasized by our model more relevant than before. Second, after 1990, FDI became the
most significant source of capital inflows from developed to developing economies, making our
model’s assumptions about the nature of international capital flows most appropriate for this
period (Loayza and Serven, 2006). To show how much the international co-movement changed,
we also present some results for the period 1975-90.
8The HP-filtered series are very similar to the series that result from using a Band-Pass filter that keeps
fluctuations with periodicity smaller than eight years (Comin and Gertler, 2006). We use the HP filter to isolate
high-frequency fluctuations to make our findings more comparable to the literature.
9There are 22 peaks and throughs at conventional frequencies.
10Specifically, we use the bootsrap method described in Comin and Gertler (2006). Essentially, the method
consists in padding the time series at both ends, and filtering the extended series. Then, for each period in the
original series, we build a 95% confidence interval.
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Before analyzing the data, an example can be useful to illustrate the co-movement patterns
between developed and developing countries. Figure 1A plots the series of HP-filtered GDP in
the U.S. and Mexico. The contemporaneous cross-country correlation is 0.42 (with a p-value
of 7%). U.S. business fluctuations such as the internet-driven expansion during the second half
of the 1990s, the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2001, the 2002-2007 expansion and the 2008
financial crisis are accompanied by similar fluctuations in Mexico. Arguably, none of the shocks
that caused these U.S. fluctuations originated in Mexico. Therefore, it is natural to think that
the co-movement between Mexico and U.S. GDP resulted from the international transmission
of U.S. business cycles.11
The effects of U.S. business cycles on Mexico’s GDP are very persistent and go beyond con-
ventional business cycle frequencies. Figure 1B plots the medium term component of Mexico’s
GDP together with HP-filtered U.S. GDP. The lead-lag relationship between these variables
can be most notably seen during the post 1995 expansion, the 2001 recession and the post-2001
expansion. Despite the severity of the effect of the Tequila crisis on the medium term compo-
nent of Mexico’s GDP, the latter strongly recovered with the U.S. post-1995 expansion. The
Mexican medium term recovery lagged the U.S. boom by about two years. The end of Mexico’s
expansion also lagged the end of the U.S. expansion by one year. Finally, the post-2001 U.S.
expansion also coincided with a boom in the medium term component of Mexico’s GDP which
continued to expand as late as 2008.
The top panel of Table 1A explores more generally these co-movement patterns using our
panel of countries for the period 1990-2008. The first row reports the coeffi cient β from the
following regression:
HPySct = α + β ∗HPyNct−k + εct
where HPySct is HP-filtered output in developing country c, and HPyNct−k is HP-filtered
output in the developed economy associated with c lagged k years. We find that an increase
by 1% in N ′s output is associated with an increase by 0.42% in S ′ output. This effect declines
monotonically and becomes insignificant when k = 2.
The second row of Table 1A reports the coeffi cient β from the following regression:
MTCySct = α + β ∗HPyNct−k + εct
11The only important Mexican shock over this period was the 1995 recession which, despite its virulence, was
relatively short-lived.
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where MTCySct is the medium term component of the medium term cycle of output in devel-
oping country c. High frequency fluctuations in output in N are associated with even larger
fluctuations in the medium term component of output in S. A 1% higher level of HP-output in
N is associated with a 0.63% higher medium term component of output in S. This association
increases when we lag the impulse in N by one year and remains the same when we lag it by
two years. Note that, if the medium term cycle in S was just an average of the short term
fluctuations, we would tend to find smaller β′s in the second row than in the first one.12 Hence,
the top panel of Table 1A suggests that short term fluctuations in N affect mechanisms that
induce fluctuations in S at frequencies below the conventional business cycle.
To obtain a better understanding of what kind of mechanisms can generate such persistent
international co-movement, we perform the same exercise but for the period 1975-1990. As
argued above, the size of trade flows and foreign direct investment flows from developed to
developing countries during this period were significantly smaller. The bottom panel of Table
1A shows that, during the 70s and 80s, there was no co-movement between output fluctuations
in developed and developing countries at business cycle frequencies. Furthermore, we find no
significant positive correlation between business cycle fluctuations in developed economies and
the medium term component of output in developing ones. This evidence suggests that the
mechanisms that drive the international co-movement were more mportant since around 1990.
But, what can these mechanisms be?
Table 1B shows that business cycle fluctuations in N are positively associated with fluctua-
tions in the number of durable manufacturing goods exported from N to S. Since many new
technologies are embodied in new durable manufacturing goods, this correlation suggests that
the speed of diffusion of new technologies from N to S co-moves with N’s cycle. Table 1B also
shows a strong co-movement between the flow of these technologies and the cycle in S.
Table 1C then explores the potential impact of fluctuations in the range of technologies
imported on S’output and productivity over the medium term. Specifically, it shows that
when looking at the medium term component of the medium term cycle, the range of durable
manufacturing goods exported from N to S is significantly correlated with output in S. One
reason for this finding is that, at relatively low frequencies, the range of capital goods imported
fromN is a key driver of productivity in S. The second row of Table 1C presents further evidence
on this hypothesis. An increase in the range of durable manufacturing goods imported from
12Furthermore, given the typical persistence of business cycles fluctuations, the associations with lags would
most likely be statistically insignificant.
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N leads to a lower price of investment goods in S. This association becomes more negative as
we increase the lag in the range of intermediate goods. This may reflect the fact that newly
adopted technologies by S do not diffuse immediately among producers in S.13
The picture that emerges from this simple exploration of the data is that the persistent
effect of business cycles in developed economies on their developing partners may be mediated
by the pro-cyclical fluctuation in the speed of international technology diffusion, which affects
the productivity in developing economies over the medium term. Next, we explore the effects
of endogenizing the international diffusion of technologies in a real business cycle model.
2 Model
To investigate the drivers of international co-movement, we develop a two-country model of
medium term business fluctuations. We denote the countries by North, N , and South, S. Our
model is a conventional real business cycle model modified to allow for endogenous productiv-
ity and relative price of capital as in Comin and Gertler (2006). The model embeds a product
lifecycle (e.g. Vernon, 1966; Wells, 1972; and Stokey, 1991). Technologies are embodied in
intermediate goods which are developed in N as a result of R&D activities. Initially, inter-
mediate goods are only locally sold in N . Eventually, they can be exported to S and finally
their production can be transferred to S (FDI) from where they are exported to N. The model
nests a version where the international diffusion of technologies is exogenous. We study the
effects of technology diffusion for the international transmission of busisness cycle fluctuations
by comparing our model with the version with exogenous technology diffusion.
2.1 Households
In each country, there is a representative household that consumes, supplies labor and saves.
It may save by either accumulating capital or lending to innovators. The household also holds
equity claims in all monopolistically competitive firms in the country. It makes one period loans
13It is important to remark that, even if statistical agencies do not do a good job in adjusting their price
deflators for gains from variety, one would expect the relative price of investment to reflect the gains from
variety if the imported intermediate goods are used to produce new investment. This will occur not because
statisticians recognize the productivity enhancing benefits from the goods at the border but because (capital
goods) producers that use the new technologies will experience lower production costs that should be reflected
in lower capital goods prices.
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to innovators and rents capital to firms. Physical capital does not flow across countries. There
is no international lending and borrowing and the only international capital flow is N ′s FDI in
S.
Let Cct be consumption and µwct a shock to the disutility of working. Then the household












subject to the budget constraint
Cct = ωctLct + Πct +DctKct − P kctJct +RctBct −Bct+1 (2)
where Πct reflects corporate profits paid out fully as dividends to households, Dct denotes the
rental rate of capital, Jct is investment in new capital, P kct is the price of investment, and Bct
is the total loans the household makes at t − 1 that are payable at t. Rct is the (possibly
state-contingent) payoff on the loans.
The household’s stock of capital evolves as follows:
Kct+1 = (1− δ(Uct))Kct + Jct, (3)
where δ(Uct) is the depreciation rate which is increasing and convex in the utilization rate as
in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988).
The household’s decision problem is simply to choose consumption, labor supply, capital and
bonds to maximize equation (1) subject to (2) and (3).
2.2 Technology
The sophistication of the production process in country c depends on the number of intermediate
goods available for production, Act. There are three types of intermediate goods. There are
Alt local intermediate goods that are only available for production in N . There are A
g
t global
intermediate goods that have successfully diffused to S. These goods are produced in N and
exported to S, and are available for production in both N and S. There are ATt intermediate
goods whose production has been transferred to S. These goods are exported from S to N and
are available for production in both N and S. The total number of intermediate goods in each
9













Innovators in N engage in R&D by investing final output to develop new intermediate goods.
The stock of invented intermediate goods, ANt, evolves according to following law of motion:
ANt+1 − ANt = φϕtANtSt − (1− φ)ANt, (6)
where St are the expenditures in R&D, (1−φ) is the per-period probability that an intermediate
good becomes obsolete, and ϕt represents the productivity of the R&D technology, which is




−ρ, with ρ ∈ (0, 1). (7)
This formulation presents aggregate diminishing returns to R&D. The term Ωt is a deterministic
trend that ensures the existence of a balance growth path in the economy.14
After developing a new technology, the innovator is granted a patent that protects her rights
to the monopolistic rents from selling the intermediate good that embodies it. These rents have
a market value of vt. The producers of local intermediate goods have the option of engaging in
a stochastic investment that, if successful, permits the diffusion of the intermediate good to S.




t is the amount of N
′s
aggregate output invested, and the function λg(.) satisfies λ
′




Global intermediate goods are exported from N to S. Exporters face an iceberg transport
cost so that 1/ψ (with ψ < 1) units of the good need to be shipped so that ogne unit arrives in
its destination. The South has comparative advantage in assembling manufacturing goods (e.g.
Iyer, 2005). In particular, it takes one unit of final output to produce a unit of intermediate good
14In particular, Ωt = (1 + gy)
t where gy is the constant growth rate of the economy in steady state.
15We do not have to take a strong stand on who engages in the investments in exporting and in transferring
the production of the goods to S. For expositional purposes, we assume it is the innovator, but the model is
isomorphic to one where he auctions the patent and somebody else is in charge of making these investments
afterwards.
16Note that this formulation includes an externality from the stock of intermediate goods. This is necessary
to ensure balanced growth. For practical purposes, it is irrelevant whether the externality depends on the stock
of local or global intermediate goods.
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in N , while if the intermediate good is assembled in S, it only takes 1/ξ(< 1) units of country
S output. Producers of global intermediate goods may take advantage of this cost advantage
by transferring the production of the global intermediate goods to S. As for exporting, we
model the transfer of production a stochastic investment. The probability of succeding in this




t /Ωt), where the function λT (.) satisfies λ
′
T > 0, λ
′′
T < 0, and x
T
t is the
amount of S ′s aggregate output invested. We denote by et the relative price of N ′s output in
terms of S (i.e., the exchange rate). Because xT is S ′s aggregate output invested by a foreign
firm to start producing in S, we denote it as FDI.
Given this product cycle structure, the stock of global and transferred intermediate goods
























The production side of the economy is composed of two sectors that produce, respectively,
aggregate output and investment. In both sectors, we allow for entry and exit that amplifies
business cycle shocks in a way similar to price or wage rigidities. In addition it allows our
model to capture the high-frequency counter-cyclicality of the relative price of investment which
is an important feature of business cycles. The dynamics of intermediate goods described in
the previous subsection determine the stock of intermediate goods available for production in
each country. Intermediate goods are embodied in new investment goods and determine their
effi ciency over the medium and long term. For simplicity, disembodied technological change is
taken as exogenous.17
Aggregate output is produced competitively by combining the outputs produced by Nyct








Each differentiated producer has access to the following production function:
Yjct = χct (UcjtKcjt)
α (Lcjt)
1−α , (11)
17Comin and Gertler (2006) endogenize both embodied and disembodied technological change in a one country
setting.
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where Ucjt, Kcjt and Lcjt are, respectively, the capital utilization rate, capital rented and labor
hours hired by firm j in country c. χct is an exogenous trend-stationary TFP shock that evolves
as follows:
log(χct) = (1− ρχ)g + ρχ log(χct−1) + ε
χ
ct, (12)
where g is the exogenous growth rate of TFP in the balanced growth path.


















, θ > 1
Final firms incur every period in a fixed (entry) cost osct to remain productive. In particular,
osct = o
s
cΩt for s = {k, y} ,
where the Ωt is a deterministic term that grows at the same rate as the economy in the balanced
growth path and ensures its existence.18
The number of final firms is determined by a free entry condition that equalizes the entry cost
with the profits in the period. Note that this formulation introduces a significant difference
between entry/exit and development/diffusion of technologies. The former involve fixed costs
while the latter involve sunk costs. As a result, the number of intermediate goods available for
production are state variables while the number of final goods firms are not. In section 5 we
study the importance of this assumption by changing the nature of the investments required
for intermediate goods to diffuse from sunk to fixed costs.
3 Symmetric equilibrium
The economy has a symmetric sequence of markets equilibrium. The endogenous state variables
are the aggregate capital stocks in each country, Kct, and the stocks of local, Alt, global, A
g
t ,
18In particular, Ωt = (1 + gy)t = (1 + g)t/(1−α) ∗ (1 + gA)t(θ−1)α, where gA is the growth rate of the number
of intermediate goods along the balanced growth path.
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and transferred, ATt , intermediate goods. The following system of equations characterizes the
equilibrium.
Resource Constraints and Aggregate Production.—The uses of output in each country are
divided into consumption, overhead costs, production of intermediate goods used in the pro-
duction of new capital and investments in the creation, diffusion and transfer of intermediate
goods:
































production of investment goods






























production of investment goods
.
The output produced in each country is given by





where the term (Nyct)
µ−1 reflects the effi ciency gains from the variety of final output producers.
Factor Markets.—The labor market in each country satisfies the requirement that the mar-
ginal product of labor equals the product of the price markup and the household’s marginal
























Optimal Investment.—The stock of capital evolves according to the following law of motion:
Kct+1 = (1− δ(Uct))Kct + Jct (19)









 = 1, (20)
where
Λc,t+1 = βCct/Cct+1. (21)
Arbitrage between acquisition of capital and loans to innovators and exporters implies









Note that, since capital markets in N and S are not integrated, interest rates may differ
across countries.
Free Entry.—Free entry by final goods producers in each sector yields the following relation-










= oKct . (24)
Profits, Market Value of Intermediates and Optimal Technology Diffusion and FDI.—The
profits accrued by local intermediate good producers depend only on the demand conditions in
N , while the profits of global and transferred intermediate goods depends also on the demand
14





























































where aNt is the ratio of the effective number of intermediate goods in N relative to Alt, and




























The market value of companies that currently hold the patent of a local, global and trans-
ferred intermediate good are, respectively,














































where the optimal investments in exporting and transferring the production of intermediate

































The optimal investment, xg and xT , equalize, at the margin, the cost and expected benefit
of exporting the intermediate good to S and of transferring the production of the intermediate
good to S.19 The marginal cost of investing one unit of output in exporting the good is 1,
19Given the symmetry between these two FOCs, we discuss only the exporting decision.
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while the expected marginal benefit is equal to the increase in the probability of international
diffusion times the discounted gain frommaking the intermediate good global
(
i.e., vgt+1 − vt+1
)
.
Equation (31) illustrates why the international diffusion of technologies is procyclical. The value
of global intermediate goods is approximately equal to the value of local goods plus the value
from exporting goods to S. Since demand in S is pro-cyclical, the capital gain from exporting
an intermediate good (i.e. vgt+1 − vt+1) is pro-cyclical. It follows then from (33) that, since λg
is a concave function, xgt is pro-cyclical.
The amount of N ′s output devoted to developing new technologies through R&D is deter-
mined by the following free entry condition:
St = φEt {ΛN,t+1vt+1(At+1 − φAt)} . (35)
These investments in the development and diffusion of technology allow us to characterize
the evolution of technology in both countries.
Balance of Payments.—The current account balance is equal to the trade balance plus the
net income from FDI investments. In equilibrium, a current account deficit needs to be financed
by an identical net inflow of capital. Since the only form of capital that flows internationally is
foreign direct investment, the financial account balance is equal to the net inflow of FDI:

























−πTt ATt︸ ︷︷ ︸
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Evolution of state variables.—The evolution of productivity over the medium and long term
in N and S depends on the dynamics of innovation, international diffusion and capital accu-
mulation. The stock of capital evolves according to equation (3). The dynamics for the stock
of intermediate goods, global goods and transferred goods are characterized, respectively, by
equations (6), (8) and (9).



















Observe from (37) and (38) that the effi ciency gains associated with Act and Nkct reduce the
marginal cost of producing investment. Fluctuations in these variables are responsible for the
evolution in the short, medium and long run of the price of new capital, PKct . However, Act and
Nkct affect P
K
ct at different frequencies.
Because Act is a state variable, it does not fluctuate in the short term. Increases in Act reflect
embodied technological change and drive the long-run trend in the relative price of capital.
Pro-cyclical investments in the development and diffusion of new intermediate goods lead to
pro-cyclical fluctuations in the growth rate of Act, generating counter-cyclical movements in PKct
over the medium term. Nkct, instead, is a stationary jump variable. Therefore, the entry/exit
dynamics drive only the short term fluctuations in PKct .
Exogenous technology diffusion .—The version of the model with exogenous technology dif-
fusion we study below is characterized by the same system of equations with the exeption that
xg and xT are fixed at their steady state levels. That is, at the levels in which equations (33)
and (34) hold along the balanced growth path.
4 Model Evaluation
In this section we explore the ability of the model to generate cycles at short and medium term
frequencies that resemble those observed in the data in developed and, especially, in developing
economies. Given our interest in medium term fluctuations, a period in the model is set to
a year. We solve the model by log-linearizing around the deterministic balanced growth path
and then employing the Anderson-Moore code, which provides numerical solutions for general
first order systems of difference equations.20 We describe the calibration before turning to some
numerical exercises.
4.1 Calibration
The calibration we present here is meant as a benchmark. We have found that our results are
robust to reasonable variations around this benchmark. To the greatest extent possible, we
use the restrictions of balanced growth to pin down parameter values. Otherwise, we look for
evidence elsewhere in the literature. There are a total of twenty-three parameters summarized
in Table 2. Eleven appear routinely in other studies. Six relate to the process of innovation
20Anderson and Moore (1983).
17
and R&D and were used, among others, in Comin and Gertler (2006). Finally, there are six
new parameters that relate to trade and the process of international diffusion of intermediate
goods. We defer the discussion of the calibration of the standard and R&D parameters to
the Appendix and focus here on the adjustment costs parameters and those that govern the
interactions between N and S.
We calibrate the six parameters that govern the interactions between N and S by matching
information on trade flows, and U.S. FDI in Mexico, the micro evidence on the cost of exporting
and the relative productivity of U.S. and Mexico in manufacturing. First, we set ξ to 2 to match
Mexico’s relative cost advantage over the U.S. in manufacturing identified by Iyer (2005). We
set the inverse of the iceberg transport cost parameter, ψ, to 0.95,21 the steady state probability
of exporting an intermediate good, λg, to 0.0875, and the steady state probability of transferring
the production of an intermediate good to S, λT , to 0.0055. This approximately matches the
share of Mexican exports and imports to and from the U.S. in Mexico’s GDP (i.e. 18% and 14%,
respectively) and the share of intermediate goods produced in the U.S. that are exported to
Mexico. Specifically, Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007) estimate that approximately
20 percent of U.S. durable manufacturing plants export. However, these plants produce a
much larger share of products than non-exporters. As a result, the share of intermediate
goods exported should also be significantly larger. We target a value of 33% for the share of
intermediate goods produced in the U.S. that are exported. This yields an average diffusion
lag to Mexico of 11 years, which seems reasonable given the evidence (e.g. Comin and Hobijn,
2010).
Das, Roberts and Tybout (2007) have estimated that the sunk cost of exporting for Colom-
bian manufacturing plants represents between 20 and 40 percent of their annual revenues from
exporting. We set the elasticity of λg with respect to investments in exporting, ρg, to 0.8 so that
the sunk cost of exporting represents approximately 30 percent of the revenues from exporting.
The elasticity of λT with respect to FDI expenses, ρT , together with the steady state value of
λT , determine the share of U.S. FDI in Mexico in steady state. We set ρT to 0.5 so that U.S.
FDI in Mexico represents approximately 2% of Mexican GDP.
21Interestingly, the value of ψ required to match the trade flows between the US and Mexico is smaller than
the values used in the literature (e.g. 1/1.2 in Corsetti et al., 2008) because of the closeness of Mexico and the
US and their lower (nonexistent after 1994) trade barriers.
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4.2 Impulse response functions
In our model there are several variables that can be the sources of economic fluctuations. For
concreteness, we present most of our results using TFP shocks (i.e. shocks to the level of
disembodied productivity) both in the U.S. and Mexico as the source of fluctuations. However,
as we show below, our findings are robust to alternative sources of fluctuations such as shocks
to the price of investment and to the wedge markup. Throughout, we use solid lines for the
responses in Mexico and dashed lines for the responses in the U.S.
Exogenous international diffusion.—We start by considering the version of our economy
where the rate of international diffusion of technologies is fixed (Figure 2). That is, λT and λg
are constant and equal to their steady state values (i.e., 0.0875 and 0.0055, respectively). The
response of the U.S. economy to a domestic TFP shock is very similar to the single-country
version presented in Comin and Gertler (2006). In particular, a negative TFP shock reduces
the marginal product of labor and capital causing a drop in hours worked (panel 2) and in
the utilization rate of capital. The drop in hours worked and in the utilization rate causes a
recession (panel 1). The response of U.S. output to the shock is more persistent than the shock
itself (panel 12) due to the endogenous propagation mechanisms of the model. In particular,
the domestic recession reduces the firms’incentives to invest in physical capital and that leads
to a drop in teh demand for intermediate goods. As a result, the return to R&D investments
also drops, leading to a temporary decline in the rate of development of new technologies but
to a permanent effect on the level of new technologies relative to trend. The long-run effect of
the shock on output is approximately forty percent of its initial response.
The U.S. shock has important effects on Mexico’s economy in the short term. When the
U.S. experiences a recession, the demand for Mexican intermediate goods declines (i.e. intensive
margin of trade). In addition, the lower current and future output reduces Mexican investment
upon impact. The decline in aggregate demand is matched by an equivalent drop in Mexican
aggregate supply caused by a reduction in the utilization rate of capital, hours worked and net
entry (which leads to a reduction in the effi ciency of final output production). However, unlike
the estimates from Tables 1A-1C, the response of the Mexican economy to the U.S. shock is
monotonic, less persistent, and always smaller than the response of the U.S. economy. This
is also the case for the wage markup and price of investment shocks (see Figure A1 in the
non-published Appendix).
Correlated shocks.—A brute-force way to increase the impact of U.S. shocks in Mexico is
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to impose an exogenous correlation in the shocks processes of the U.S. and Mexican economy.
This fix raises the question of what could be driving the correlation of the shocks. In reality,
few shocks are international in nature. Therefore, the cross-country correlation between shocks
should be relatively small. Indeed, if we focus on TFP shocks, the empirical contemporaneous
cross-country correlation in TFP tends to be relatively small. For the case of Mexico and the
US, the correlation between HP-filtered annual TFP since 1990 is 0.39.22
Despite these caveats, it may still be instructive to explore how allowing for cross-country
correlation in TFP shocks affects the response of the Mexican economy to a U.S. shock. Figure
3 plots the impulse response to a U.S. shock when calibrating the contemporaneous effect of
U.S. TFP on Mexico TFP at 0.4, which we regard as an upper bound.23 Despite the exogenous
correlation of the shocks, we continue to find that both the impact of the U.S. shock and,
especially, the peristence of its effects are larger in the U.S. than in Mexico. We therefore
conclude that the model with exogenous technology diffusion does not capture the pattern of
international co-movemnet we have documented in section 2.
Endogenous international technology diffusion.—Next, we explore the role of the endogenous
diffusion of technologies in the international propagation of shocks. Figure 4 plots the response
to a contractionary shock to U.S. TFP in the full-blown model. The response of the U.S.
economy is very similar to Figure 2, where international diffusion was exogenous. This is the
case because potential feed-backs from Mexico are negligible for the U.S. Also, as in Figure 2,
the U.S. shock has an important effect on the Mexican economy, upon impact. The magnitude
of the initial response is similar because the initial propagation channel is the same (a drop
in the demand for Mexican exports). However, the shape and persistence of the response
changes significantly once we allow for the speed of intenational technology diffusion to vary
endogenously. In particular, the response of the Mexican economy to a U.S. shock is hump-
shaped; within two years, it surpases the effect that the shock has on the U.S. itself, reaching
the maximum impact approximately within five years. After ten years, the effect of the shock
in Mexican output is still similar to the initial impact.
Why such a protracted and non-monotonic impact of U.S. shocks in Mexico? By endogenizing
the diffusion of technology from the U.S. to Mexico, we introduce new margins of pro-cyclical
22Since 1980 it is -0.02 and since 1950 it is 0.11.
23Kehoe and Perri (2002) set the cross-country correlation of TFP shocks in their two-country model to 0.25
which they claim is in line with the VAR estimates of U.S. and a subsample of Western European countries
(Baxter and Crucini, (1995), Kollmann (1996) and Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992)).
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variation in the state variables that govern the medium term dynamics of productivity in
Mexico, Ag and AT . More specifically, contractionary shocks such as a negative shock to U.S.
TFP reduce the return to exporting new intermediate goods and to transferring their production
to Mexico. As a result, fewer resources are devoted to these investments, xg and xT , (panel
7). Because the stock of Mexican technologies (Ag and AT ) are state variables, declines in
xg and xT only generate a gradual reduction of the stock of intermediate goods available for
production in Mexico relative to the steady state (panel 8). Since the stock of intermediate
goods determines the productivity in the capital producing sector, this results in a reduction in
the productivity of capital which manifests itself in a higher relative price of investment (panel
6) over the medium term.
The prospect of lower aggregate demand, initially, reduces investment causing net exit of
final investment good producers. Due to the presence of effi ciency gains from the number of
final capital producers, exit reduces the effi ciency in the production of investment goods causing
an initial increase in the price of investment (panel 6).24 However, note that the initial drop
of investment in Mexico is smaller than in the U.S. This is the case because, in Mexico, the
price of investment is expected to increase more than in the U.S. Since investment is cheap
relative to its future price, Mexican firms, initially, undertake smaller cuts in investment. As
the price of invetsment gradually increases, Mexican investment drops further contributing
to the subsequent drop in output. This is how the endogenous diffusion and international
transfer of technologies generate a hump-shaped response for the number of intermediate goods,
productivity, investment and output in Mexico.25
One may wonder about the nature and values of the parameters that affect the hump-shaped
response of Mexican technology to the U.S. shock. Inspection of the laws of motion of Ag and AT
(equations 8 and 9) suggests that the elasticities of diffusion and technology transfer with respect
to xg and xT are key in governing these dynamics. In particular, they play two roles. First, for
given investments xg and xT , the elasticities determine the contribution of the investments to
the number of intermediate goods available for production (and produced) in Mexico. Second,
from the optimal investment equations (33) and (34), the higher the elasticities, the larger are
24The price of investment also increases upon impact due to the shift in the use from foreign to domestically-
produced intermediate goods after the initial depreciation of the peso (to be discussed below).
25The effect that the international diffusion of technology has on the persistence of output in developing
countries can provide a microfoundation for the finding of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) that (in a reduced
form specification) the shocks faced by developing countries are more persistent than those faced by developed
economies.
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the fluctuations in xg and xT in response to a given expected capital gain. These intuitions
are illustrated in Figure 5 where we plot the impulse response function to a U.S. TFP shock
in a version of the model where we have calibrated the elasticities of λg and λT with respect
to xg and xT to 0.2 (instead of our baseline values of 0.8 and 0.5, respectively). We consider
that this calibration captures a key aspect of the pre-NAFTA/pre-globalization period where
investments in FDI and in exporting new goods were much less prominent. As Figure 5 shows,
in this scenario, U.S. shocks had a much more transitory effect on Mexican macro variables.26
Still, one may wonder why is it the case that medium termfluctuations in Mexican technology
in response to a U.S. shock may be larger than in the U.S. itself. This is the result of various
forces. First, the stock of technologies available for production is smaller in Mexico than in
the U.S.; therefore, a given change in the flow of new technologies will tend to generate larger
fluctuations over the medium term in the stock of available technologies. Second, anticipating
the effects that a given fluctuation in xg and xT have on Ag and AT (and therefore on output and
investment), over the medium term, xg and xT tend to drop more than R&D, S, in response to
a contractionary U.S. shock. The final element that contributes to generating a higher eventual
impact of the U.S. shock in Mexico than in the U.S. itself is the exchange rate (panel 11,
where an increase represents a real appreciation in Mexico vis a vis the U.S.). The depreciation
of the peso in response to the shock has opposite effects in the effective stock of available
intermediate goods in the U.S. and Mexico. In the U.S., a depreciation of the peso makes
transferred intermediate goods more attractive increasing the effective number of intermediate
goods available for production (i.e., aNt ∗ Alt); in Mexico, instead, the depreciation of the peso
makes more expensive imported intermediate goods reducing the effi ency gains from using
global intermediate goods and hence the effective number of available intermediate goods (i.e.,
aSt ∗ Agt ).
We conclude our qualitative exploration of the model’s response to a U.S. shock by studying
the impact on the exchange rate. In steady state, there is a net inflow of FDI to Mexico in
the form of the investments made by multinationals that want to transfer the production of
intermediate goods to Mexico. The surplus in the financial account implies that in steady state,
Mexico has a deficit in the current account. Since, its trade balance with the U.S. is positive,
in our model, the negative current account balance comes from the negative net income due
to the repatriation of multinational profits. Following a contractionary U.S. shock, the decline
26In results not reported, we have shown that the initial impact of the U.S. shock in Mexico also is smaller
when we calibrate higher transport costs so that the volume of trade is smaller.
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in the return to transferring production to Mexico, causes a large drop in FDI inflows (i.e.,
xT , panel 7), a phenomenon that echoes the “sudden stops”literature (e.g. Calvo, 1998). The
drop in FDI inflows reduces the ability of the Mexican economy to finance its current account
deficit. Despite the reduction in net income outflows (due to the reduction in multinational
profits, πT ), restoring the balance of payments requires the peso to depreciate, and in this way
reduce the volume of U.S. exports to Mexico. Hence, the depreciation of the peso that follows
a contractionary U.S. shock.
Response to a Mexican Shock.—To complete our analysis of the model’s impulse responses,
we study the effects of Mexican TFP shocks (see Figure 6). There are some striking differences
with the response to the U.S. shock. First, a Mexican shock has a very small effect in the U.S.
This follows from the difference in size between the two economies. One consequence is that
the Mexican shock has a much smaller effect on U.S. R&D investments than the U.S. shock. As
a result, the slowdown in the flow of intermediate goods to Mexico is less protracted than for
the U.S. shock (panel 8) generating a less persistent response of Mexican output. This in turn
leads to more muted firms’responses in their investment decisions. In particular, the Mexican
shock leads to smaller reductions by U.S. firms in the resources they invest in exporting and
transfering the production of intermediate goods to Mexico (panel 7). Similarly, Mexican firms
respond by cutting domestic investment in physical capital by less (panel 4). As a result, of
these differences, the fluctuations in the range of technologies available for production in Mexico
is smaller and less protracted in response to the Mexican shock than to the US shock.
In addition to the dynamics of technology, another element that dampens the effect of the
shock on the Mexican economy is the exchange rate (panel 11). Unlike the U.S. shock, a
contractionary TFP shock to Mexico leads to an appreciation of the peso. The response of the
real exchange rate affects the behavior of the investment-output ratio in both countries. In
Mexico, the investment-output ratio drops less than with the U.S. shock because now Mexican
firms can import U.S. intermediate goods more cheaply. In the U.S., the appreciation of the
peso makes imported intermediate goods more expensive reducing the effective productivity
of the investment sector (panel 6). Firms respond to the higher investment prices by cutting
invetsment a lot (relative to the actual drop in U.S. output) (panel 4). This same logic accounts
for the worsening of the Mexican trade balance.
Finally, the last feature of the impulse response functions that deserve attention is the
response of domestic interest rates to a Mexican shock. As shown by Neumeyer and Perri
(2005), an important feature of business cycles in developing countries is the counter-cyclicality
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of real interest rates. Our model delivers this result endogenously (panel 5). In our model,
the procyclical diffusion of technologies generates counter-cyclical fluctuations in the relative
price of capital. This is the case because, as one can see from expression (22), interest rates in
our model not only reflect the marginal product of capital but also the capital gains from the
appreciation in the price of capital. The pro-cyclical diffusion of technologies induces counter-
cyclical capital gains from holding a unit of capital. In the case of the domestic Mexican shock,
this second effect dominates the pro-cyclical response of the marginal product of capital (i.e.
the dividend), thus inducing interest rates in S (as well as the interest differential with respect
to N) to be counter-cyclical.
4.3 Simulations
We next turn to the quantitative evaluation of the model. To this end, we calibrate the volatility
and persistence of TFP shocks in the U.S. and Mexico and run 1000 simulations over a 17-year
long horizon each. Since we intend to evaluate the model’s ability to propagate shocks both
internationally and over time, we use the same autocorrelation for both U.S. andMexican shocks
and set the cross-country correlation of the shocks to zero. We set the annual autocorrelation
of TFP shocks to 0.8 to match the persistence of output in the U.S.27
We calibrate the volatility of the shocks by forcing the model to approximately match the
high frequency standard deviation of GDP in Mexico and the U.S. This yields a volatility of the
TFP shocks of 2.16% in the U.S. and 3.73% in Mexico. This is consistent with the suspicion
that developing economies are prone to bigger disturbances than developed countries.
Volatility.—Table 3 compares the standard deviations of the high frequency and medium
term cycle fluctuations in the data and in the model. Our calibration strategy forces the model
to match the volatilities of output in Mexico and the U.S. at the high frequency. In addition,
the model also comes very close to matching the volatility of output over the medium term
both in Mexico (0.045 vs. 0.037 in the data) and in the U.S. (0.022 vs. 0.015 in the data).
Given the low persistence of shocks, matching these moments suggests that the model induces
the right amount of propagation of high frequency shocks into the medium term.
The model does a good job in reproducing the volatility observed in the data in most variables
27See Comin and Gertler (2006) for details. Note that, because of the propagation obtained from the endoge-
nous technology mechanisms, this class of models requires a smaller autocorrelation of the shocks to match the
persistence in macro variables. In short, they are not affected by the Cogley and Nason (1995) criticism that
the Neoclassical growth model does not propagate exogenous disturbances.
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other than output. The model generates series for investment, bilateral trade flows, and FDI
flows that have similar volatilities to those observed in the data both at the high frequency and
medium term. For those instances where there are some differences, the empirical volatilities
tend to fall within the 95% confidence interval for the standard deviation of the simulated series.
The model tends to underpredict teh volatility of the relative price of capital, and the extensive
margin of trade. This however, is an indication that our calibration of the endogenous diffusion
mechanisms does not overstate its importance relative to the data. The variable where the
model fails is consumption. The model underpredicts the volatility of consumption in Mexico,
especially at the high frequency. This may be a reflection of our model’s lack of financial
frictions in developing countries which may enhance the volatility of consumption in the data.
In the U.S., instead, consumption is about as volatile in the model as in the data.
Co-movement.—Most international business cycle models have problems reproducing the
cross-country co-movement patterns observed in macro variables. First, they lack international
propagation mechanisms that induce a strong positive co-movement in output. Second, they
tend to generate a stronger cross-country co-movement in consumption than in output, while
in the data we observe the opposite (Backus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1992).28
Our model fares well in both of these dimensions. Panel A of Table 4 reports the cross
country correlations between Mexico and the U.S. for consumption and output, both in the
model and in the data. The model generates the strong co-movement between U.S. and Mexico
GDPs observed in the data. The average cross-country correlation in our simulations is 0.72
with a confidence interval of (0.4 , 0.9) that contains the correlation observed in the data (0.43).
The model also generates a smaller cross-country correlation for consumption than for output,
as we observe in the data: The average cross-correlation is 0.31 with a confidence interval that
contains the empirical correlation (0.2).29
The endogenous diffusion of technology contributes to generating this cross-country co-
movement pattern. Intuitively, the endogenous diffusion of technology generates a strong
cross-country co-movement in output and productivity over the medium term. Anticipating
28Several authors, including Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Kollmann (1996), have shown that reducing the
completeness of international financial markets is not suffi cient to match the data along these dimensions. Kehoe
and Perri (2002) have made significant progress by introducing enforcement contraints on financial contracts.
This mechanism limits the amount of risk sharing, reducing consumption co-movement and increasing the
cross-country co-movement in output. However, output still co-moves significantly less than in the data.
29The international business cycle literature has also found it diffi cult to generate positive cross-correlations
in investment and employment (Baxter, 1995). As it is clear from Figure 4, our model delivers both.
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the future evolution of the economy, Mexican firms adjust investment contemporaneously. The
large effect that foreign shocks have on domestic investment limits the possibility for a large
consumption response, hence inducing a higher cross-country correlation in output than in
consumption.
Panel B of Table 4 reports the contemporaneous correlation between the HP-filtered Mexican
variables and HP-filtered output in both Mexico and the U.S.30 Broadly speaking, the model
does a good job in capturing the contemporaneous co-movement patterns within Mexico but
also between Mexico and the U.S. The model generates a positive, albeit insignificant correlation
between consumption and output in Mexico (0.47 vs. 0.78 in the data). Also, in both model
and data, Mexico’s consumption is more correlated with Mexico’s GDP than with the U.S.
The model captures the strong co-movement between Mexican investment and output in both
the U.S. (0.78 vs. 0.6 in the data) and Mexico (0.99 vs. 0.62 in the data). In our model, the
pro-cyclical response of investment is in part due to the counter-cyclicality of the relative price
of investment. Our model approximately matches the co-movement between Mexico’s output
and the price of new capital (-0.8 vs. -0.54 in the data), although it overstates the co-movement
between the price of capital in Mexico and U.S. GDP (-0.9 in model vs. 0.13 in data). Similarly,
recall that the medium term productivity dynamics in Mexico result from the cyclicality of the
flow of intermediate goods that diffuse to Mexico (i.e. the extensive margin of trade). The
model matches quite closely the correlation between our data-counterpart for this variable and
output in both the U.S. (0.42 vs. 0.28 in the data) and in Mexico (0.36 vs. 0.42 in the data).
The model also captures broadly the cyclicality of the bilateral trade flows. In particular,
the model generates the strong counter-cyclicality of Mexico’s trade balance. The correlation
between Mexico’s trade balance and GDP is -0.96 vs. -0.83 in the data. This is the case because,
both in the data and in our model, imports from the U.S. co-move more with Mexico’s GDP
than exports to the U.S. However, the model overpredicts the cycality of Mexican exports to the
U.S. (with respect to Mexican GDP). The model approximately captures the high correlation
of bilateral trade flows with U.S. GDP.
A variable where the model underperforms is FDI. Though the model matches the cyclicality
of FDI in the data, the correlations with both U.S. and Mexico’s GDP are too high. This may
reflect the presence of a small but volatile component in actual FDI that does not respond to
the U.S. or Mexican business cycle. This hypothesis seems to be supported by the fact that
30Note that we do not filter the growth rate of intermediate goods since this variable is already trend stationary.
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FDI is much more persistent in our model than in the data.31
Inter-frequency Co-movement.—One of the motivations for our model was the observation
that U.S. high frequency fluctuations lead medium term fluctuations in Mexico. The impulse
response functions to U.S. shocks (see Figure 2) show that, qualitatively, the model is able
to generate these persistent effects. Table 5 explores the quantitative power of the model to
reproduce the inter-frequency co-movement patterns we observe in the data. The first row
of Table 5 reports the empirical correlation between lagged HP-filtered U.S. output and the
medium term component of Mexico’s output. The second row reports the average of these
statistics across 1000 simulations of the model.
The model roughly captures the contemporaneous correlation between high frequency fluc-
tuations in U.S. output and medium term fluctuations in Mexico’s output (0.33 in the model
vs. 0.28 in the data). More importantly, the model generates a hump-shaped cross-correlogram
between these two variables as we observed in the data. However, in the data the peak cor-
relation occurs after two years (0.53), while in the model it occurs on average after one year
(0.37).
A key prediction of our model is that the high frequency response of FDI and the extensive
margin of trade to U.S. shocks generates counter-cyclical fluctuations in the relative price of
capital in Mexico over the medium term. The fourth row in Table 5 presents the average cor-
relation across our 1000 simulations between the medium term component of Mexico’s relative
price of capital and HP-filtered U.S. output at various lags. In both actual and simulated data,
the contemporaneous correlation is insignificant. The correlation becomes more negative as we
lag U.S. GDP in both cases. In the simulated data the peak (in absolute terms) is reached after
one years (-0.44), while in the actual data it is reached after three years (-0.5).
Unlike U.S. shocks, Mexican shocks do not have a hump-shaped effect on Mexico’s output
over the medium term fluctuations. The correlation between HP-filtered and the medium term
component of Mexico’s output is positive and declines monotonically as we lag the series of
HP-filtered output.32 Our model is consistent with this co-movement pattern. (See rows 5 and
6 in Table 5.)33
31In particular, the annual autocorrelation of FDI/GDP in our model is 0.42 while in the data it is -0.35.
32In the working paper version, we make a similar point by estimating VARs with HP-filtered Mexico’s GDP
and the medium term component of several Mexican variables (including GDP).
33A similar (but negative) co-movement patter is generated in the model between Hp-filtered output and teh
medium term component of teh relative price of capital in Mexico. In the data the co-movementbetween these
variables is also negative but insignificant. (See rows 7 and 8 in Table 5.)
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5 Discussion
Next, we explore in more detail the implications of our model and compare it to existing models
of trade and international business cycles.
Other Shocks.—For concreteness, we have used TFP shocks as the sole source of fluctuations
in our simulations. However, our findings are not driven by the nature of the shocks. To
illustrate this, we introduce shocks to the wage markup and to the price of investment. Figure
7 presents the impulse response functions to a (positive) wage markup shock (second row) and
a (positive) shock to the price of investment (third row) both in the U.S. To facilitate the
comparison, the impulse response function to the U.S. TFP shock is presented in the first row
of the figure.
Qualitatively, the impulse response functions to these shocks are very similar. In all of them
there is a large effect upon the impact of the U.S. shock on Mexican output. All shocks generate
a hump-shaped response of Mexico’s output. And in all three cases, the U.S. shock eventually
has a larger effect on Mexico than in the U.S. The economics of the response are the same as
in the TFP shock described above. All three shocks trigger a large and persistent slowdown in
the flow of new technologies to Mexico and an initial decline in Mexico’s investment larger than
the initial decline in consumption. As the productivity of the capital goods sector deteriorates
relative to trend, investment declines further generating the hump in the output response. The
response to Mexican shocks is also robust to the nature of the shocks (see Figure A2).
Sunk vs. Fixed Exporting Costs.—Much of the theoretical international macro literature that
has incorporated the extensive margin of trade has relied on extensions of the Melitz (2003)
model. The Melitz model is a two country model with firms of heterogenous productivity and
where firms have to incur in some costs to export. Unlike our model, most of the models that
have used the Melitz framework to explore business cycle dynamics use fixed cost instead of
sunk cost to adjust the range of intermediate goods available for production.
The empirical literature on firm dynamics and exports has found that there are large sunk
costs of exporting new products (e.g. Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Das et al., 2007). However,
the use of fixed costs could be defended on the grounds of their tractability if the model with
fixed costs has propagation and amplification power similar to that of the model with sunk costs
of exporting. To explore whether this is the case, we develop a version of our model where,
to export intermediate goods, firms in N now just need to incur a per period fixed cost. For
consistency, we also make the investment in transferring production from N to S a fixed cost.
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Other than these two changes, this version of the model is identical to our original model. This
model is basically a variation on the financial autarky model in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) with
physical capital and without heterogeneity. We calibrate the fixed costs of exporting and FDI
so that in steady state the trade flows are the same as in our original model.
Figure 8 plots the impulse response functions to a (negative) TFP shock in the U.S. in
the model with fixed costs. The differences with our original model are remarkable. In the
model with fixed costs of exporting and FDI, a contractionary U.S. shock causes no effect in
Mexico’s output upon impact. The sharp contrast between the responses in figures 4 and 7 is
ultimately due to the different nature of the costs of technology diffusion in the two models.
With the fixed costs of exporting and transferring technologies, the stock of technologies in S
depends on the profits accrued by local, global and transferred intermediate goods and on the
exchange rate. Since all these are jump variables, this means that Ag and AT are no longer
state variables. As a result, investments in exporting and transferring production no longer have
persistent effects on the productivity level in S. As a result, productivity in S fluctuates less
over the medium term, generating also a more muted response of the relative price of capital.
Anticipating smaller increases in the price of investment and smaller drops in future demand,
Mexican firms undertake smaller cuts in their investment, upon impact. The smaller response
of investment in Mexico has two significant feedback effects. First, it leads to a smaller drop in
the profits accrued by intermediate goods producers in Mexico, further dampening the response
of investments in technology diffusion. Second, the smaller drop in Mexican investment implies
that now Mexican net exports are counter-cyclical, while with the sunk cost formulation they
responded pro-cyclically to U.S. shocks. As a result, in response to a contractionary shock to
U.S. TFP, net exports increase dampening further the impact on Mexican output of the shock.
Implications for Aggregate Volatility.—It is clear from Figure 4 that U.S. shocks are a signif-
icant source of volatility in Mexico’s GDP. But what share of Mexican fluctuations is due to
U.S. shocks and what share is due to domestic shocks? Similarly, how much do Mexican shocks
contribute to the volatility of U.S. GDP?
Table 6 answers these questions by reporting the share of output volatility in each country
attributable to each kind of shock. The first two columns focus on the volatility of HP-filtered
output while the next two focus on the volatility of output over the medium term cycle. Con-
sistent with Figure 6, Mexican shocks account for a small fraction of U.S. fluctuations (10% at
high frequency and 11% over the medium term cycle).
In contrast, U.S. shocks represent a very significant source of Mexican fluctuations. At
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the high frequency, 65% of Mexico’s GDP volatility is driven by U.S. shocks, while over the
medium term cycle, U.S. shocks induce 69% of the volatility in Mexico’s GDP. This proves the
importance of explicitly modelling the U.S. economy to study the business and medium term
cycles of the Mexican economy.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed an asymmetric two-country model to study business cycle
fluctuations in developing countries. The model introduces two key elements: (i) endogenous
and slow diffusion of technologies from the developed to the developing country, and (ii) flow
adjustment costs to investment. These mechanisms yield four predictions consistent with the
business cycles of developing countries.
First, business cycle shocks to developed economies have large effects on developing economies.
Second, these effects are persistent inducing fluctuations at frequencies lower than the conven-
tional business cycle. Third, the cross-country correlation of output is higher than that of
consumption. Fourth, interest rates are counter-cyclical in developing countries. After cali-
brating the model to the Mexican economy, we have found that the model also does a good
job quantitatively. The main shortcoming it presents is its inability to generate a consumption
series in developing countries that is as volatile as in the data. One possible avenue to achieve
this is by introducing financial frictions in developing countries which may limit consumption
smoothing.
One of the key contributions of this paper is to extend the business cycle models of endoge-
nous technology (e.g. Comin and Gertler, 2006) to two-country settings. There are several
alternative configurations of the two countries that are worth pursuing. One natural variation
is to model both countries as advanced economies that develop new technologies through R&D
and adopt each other’s technologies. This configuration would naturally capture the interac-
tions between the U.S. and the EU, or the U.S. and Japan. A second variation could be to keep
the asymmetry between the developed and developing countries but introduce low frequency
transitions in the developing country to its balanced growth path. This configuration would be
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   Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions to Negative U.S. TFP Shock,
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                 Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions to Negative U.S. TFP Shock
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 Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions to Negative U.S. TFP Shock,
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Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions to Negative U.S. TFP Shock Pre−NAFTA, 
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Figure 6: Impulse Response Functions to Negative Mexico TFP Shock,
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Figure 7: Impulse Response Functions for U.S. TFP, Wage Markup and Price of Investment Shocks,
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          Figure 8: Impulse Response Functions to Negative U.S. TFP Shock, 
Model with Fixed Costs of International Technology Diffusion (U.S.Dash, Mexico, solid)
Table 1A: High and Medium Term Effects on Developing Economies of High Frequency Fluctuations 
in Developed economies 
                          
Developed GDP (HP‐filtered) 
Lags  0 1 2 3 
Period: 1990‐2008 
Developing GDP (HP‐filtered)  0.42*** 0.29*** 0.11 0.05 
Developing GDP (Medium Term Component)  0.63*** 0.76*** 0.61*** 0.39 
Period: 1975‐1990 
Developing GDP (HP‐filtered)    0.12   0.20   0.22   0.12 
                   









Varieties imported from U.S. (HP‐filtered)  0.17*** 0.62*** 
Varieties imported from U.S. (Medium term 





                          
Durable manufacturing varieties imported from 
developed country 
Lags  0 1 2 3 
GDP developing country  0.15*** 0.17*** 0.12** 0.03 












α Labor income = 0.66 0.33
β Investment share = 0.22 0.95
δ 0.1, (BEA) 0.1
U 0.8, (U.S. Board of Bovernors) 0.8
δ′′(U) ∗ U/δ′(U) 0.15, (Jaimovich & Rebelo, 2006) 0.15
ζ Share of hours worked = 0.4 0.5
µc 1.1, (Basu and Fernald, 1997) 1.1
µk 1.15, (Basu and Fernald, 1997) 1.15
LN/LS Relative population =3 3
Z0N/Z0S Relative GDP = 12 3.35
g Productivity Growth = 0.024 (BLS) 0.0072
R&D
φ 0.1, (average of Caballero & Jaffe, Pakes & Schankerman, ) 0.9
bc Aggregate overhead costs = 10% GDP 0.05
bkc Measure of final capital firms =1 0.016
χ Growth relative price capital = -0.026 2.69
θ Share of R&D in durable manufacturing = 1% 1.5
ρ 0.65, (Griliches, 1990) 0.65
Trade and Diffusion
ξ 2, (Iyer, 2003) 2
ψ Mexican imports from US = 14% Mexico GDP 0.95
λg Value weighted share of US firms that export = 0.33 0.0875
λT Mexican exports to US = 20% Mexico GDP 0.0055
ρg Sunk costs of exporting = 0.3, (Das et al., 2007) 0.8
ρT US FDI/ Mexico GDP = 0.02 0.5
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Table 3: Volatility Model vs. Data 
                 
High Frequency  Medium term Cycle 
MEXICO  Data  Model     Data  Model 
GDP   0.026 0.024 0.037 0.045 
(0.020, 0.042) (0.029, 0.073) 
CONSUMPTION  0.031 0.003 0.040 0.009 
(0.003, 0.005) (0.006, 0.014) 
INVESTMENT  0.079 0.079 0.082 0.149 
(0.067, 0.138) (0.096, 0.242) 
RELATIVE PRICE OF 
CAPITAL  0.029 0.012 0.042 0.023 
(0.011, 0.016) (0.017, 0.031) 
IMPORTS (FROM US)  0.090 0.076 0.117 0.141 
(0.065, 0.121) (0.086, 0.215) 
EXPORTS (TO US)  0.090 0.065 0.134 0.110 
(0.059, 0.098) (0.075, 0.168) 
TRADE SUPLUS/GDP  0.014 0.014 0.026 0.026 









FDI/GDP  0.004 0.003 0.005 0.012 
(0.003, 0.005) (0.007, 0.019) 
             
U.S.                
GDP   0.013 0.015 0.015 0.022 
(0.014, 0.016) (0.018, 0.025) 
CONSUMPTION  0.008 0.006 0.012 0.013 
(0.006, 0.007) (0.011, 0.015) 
INVESTMENT  0.064 0.089 0.084 0.129 
(0.088, 0.097) (0.101, 0.142) 











GDP   0.43* 0.72 
(0.40, 0.90) 




Data  Model  Data  Model 
CONSUMPTION  0.02 0.35 0.78*** 0.47 
(-0.18, 0.75) (-0.15, 0.87) 
INVESTMENT  0.6*** 0.78 0.62*** 0.99 
(0.53, 0.92) (0.97, 1.00) 
RELATIVE PRICE OF CAPITAL  0.13 -0.90 -0.54*** -0.80 
(-0.96, -0.83) (-0.95, -0.52) 
IMPORTS (FROM US)  0.61*** 0.84 0.83*** 0.98 
(0.62, 0.96) (0.94, 0.99) 
EXPORTS (TO US)  0.68*** 0.91 0.08 0.92 
(0.79, 0.98) (0.83, 0.97) 
MEXICAN TRADE 
SURPLUS/GDP  0.07 -0.73 -0.83*** -0.99 





0.28 (dur.) 0.42 
0.35 (all) 
0.42 (dur.) 0.36 
(0.05, 0.74) (-0.02, 0.68) 
FDI/GDP  0.23 0.78 0.11 0.87 
(0.54, 0.92) (0.70, 0.97) 









                 
Lags of High Frequency US Output 
0  1  2  3 
MEDIUM TERM COMPONENT MEX GDP 
Data  0.28 0.49* 0.53* 0.39 
Model  0.33** 0.37** 0.33** 0.20** 
MEDIUM TERM COMPONENT RELATIVE PRICE OF CAPITAL IN MEX  
Data  0.35 0.02 -0.24 -0.50** 
Model  -0.39** -0.44** -0.36** -0.21 
Lags of High Frequency MEX Output 
0  1  2  3 
MEDIUM TERM COMPONENT MEX GDP 
Data  0.45** 0.32 0.05 -0.16 
Model  0.64** 0.59** 0.40 0.15** 
MEDIUM TERM COMPONENT RELATIVE PRICE OF CAPITAL IN MEX  
Data  -0.13 -0.32 -0.34 -0.22 
Model  -0.54** -0.50** -0.36** -0.15** 







                       
High Frequency  Medium Term Cycle 
US volatility  Mexican volatility  US volatility  Mexican volatility 
US Shocks  0.90 0.65 0.89 0.69 
Mexico Shocks  0.10 0.35 0.11 0.31 
                          
Note: Share of output volatility in the relevant country at the relevant frequency associated to shocks either from the US or Mexico. 
High frequency fluctuations are isolated using a Hodrick‐Prescott filter with filtering parameter 100. Medium term cycle  is 
obtained by using a Band Pass filter that isolates fluctuations associated with cycles of period shorter than 50 years.  
